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Abstract
How do movements in the distribution of income a⁄ect the macroeconomy? Krusell and
Smith (1998) analyzed this question in a neoclassical growth model, and their results show that
the representative-agent assumption provides a good approximation for aggregate behaviors
of heterogeneous agents. This paper extends their analysis to a cash-in-advance model with
heterogeneous money demand. It is shown that movements in the distribution of monetary
income can have signi￿cant impact on the macroeconomy. For example, the dynamic responses
of aggregate output to monetary shocks behave very di⁄erently from those of a representative
agent; the welfare costs of moderate in￿ ation are much higher than previously thought, up to
20% of consumption when the inequality of cash distribution is su¢ ciently large. This is in sharp
contrast to the ￿ndings of Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Lucas (2000) based on representative-
agent models.
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11 Introduction
The in￿nite-horizon, representative-agent neoclassical growth model and its monetized versions
remain the paradigm of business-cycle and monetary policy analysis in macroeconomics. The
major reason is not only the framework￿ s analytical tractability; the accuracy of the representative-
agent assumption for approximating aggregate dynamics of heterogeneous agents has also gained
strong support from the literature, most notably the work of Krusell and Smith (1998). They use
a numerical-computation method to show that taking heterogeneous households into consideration
makes little di⁄erence with respect to the model￿ s predictions for aggregate dynamics. Similar
results are also obtained by other papers in di⁄erent contexts. For example, Imrohoroglu (1989) and
Krusell and Smith (1999) show that the welfare costs of business cycles with uninsurable individual
risks are small and similar to those calculated by Lucas (1987) based on a representative-agent
model; Imrohoroglu (1992), Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002), and Costa and Werning (2008)
show that the welfare costs of in￿ ation with heterogeneous agents are on the same order as those
in representative-agent models1; Thomas (2002) shows that ￿rm-level lumpy investment does not
change the aggregate dynamics of a representative-agent RBC model.2
This paper extends the analysis of Krusell and Smith (1998) to a heterogeneous-agent growth
model with cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints and compares the model with its representative-agent
counterpart (e.g., Cooley and Hansen, 1989), which is the canonical framework for monetary policy
analysis.3 I show that heterogeneity can lead to dramatically di⁄erent implications for business
cycle and monetary policies. These di⁄erences include: (i) The velocity of money is highly variable
in the heterogeneous-agent model, in contrast to the ￿ndings of Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas
(1991) based on a representative-agent model. (ii) Transitory lump-sum monetary injections can
increase aggregate output, unlike the implications under the representative-agent assumption. (iii)
In￿ ation can be extremely costly: under an annual in￿ ation rate of 10% and su¢ ciently large
inequality in cash holdings, households are willing to reduce up to 20% of average consumption
each year in exchange for the Friedman-rule in￿ ation rate, in sharp contrast to the ￿ndings of
Cooley and Hansen (1989) and others in the literature.
However, consistent with the ￿ndings of Krusell and Smith (1998), the model￿ s aggregate dy-
namics under technology shocks are similar to those of a representative-agent model. The reason is
1This literature tends to ￿nd higher welfare costs of in￿ ation in heterogeneous-agent models; but the absolute
magnitude is still small, just a few percentage points of consumption under moderate in￿ ation rates.
2Miao and Wang (2009) explain why ￿rm-level lumpiness may not matter for aggregate dynamics. Wang and Wen
(2009) show that ￿rm-level heterogeneity reduces aggregate investment volatility under technology shocks.
3See, e.g., Lucas and Stokey, 1987; Ireland, 1996; Mankiw and Reis, 2002; and Woodford, 2003. For a comprehen-
sive literature review on recent development in monetary theories, see Williamson and Wright (2008).
2that technology shocks have no e⁄ect on the equilibrium distribution of income over time; hence,
the median individual￿ s dynamic behaviors are the same as the aggregate dynamics. But this is
not the case under monetary shocks.
Krusell and Smith (1998, p.870) base their explanations for their ￿ndings on the intuition "that
the utility costs from ￿ uctuations in consumption are quite small and that self-insurance with only
one asset is quite e⁄ective." By the same token, one would expect that similar results hold true in
a heterogeneous-agent CIA model with capital accumulation because the welfare cost of in￿ ation is
also found to be quite small in the literature based on representative-agent models (see, e.g., Cooley
and Hansen, 1989; Dotsey and Ireland, 1996; and Lucas, 2000). However, this intuition does not
apply in general. For example, the welfare costs of moderate in￿ ation in my model are several
orders larger than those obtained by the literature. There are three reasons behind this result: (i)
Agents with large money holdings su⁄er disproportionately more from in￿ ation tax than do agents
with smaller real balances. (ii) Anticipated in￿ ation reduces everyone￿ s money demand; hence,
the fraction of the population with a binding CIA constraint increases signi￿cantly with in￿ ation.
This generates additional welfare costs along the extensive margin. (iii) Agents opt to switch
from "cash" goods (consumption) to "credit" goods (leisure), thereby reducing labor supply and
aggregate output. These three channels reinforce each other. In representative-agent models, only
the third channel exists; hence, the implied welfare costs of in￿ ation are small. However, the ￿rst
two channels are extremely important for business-cycle and welfare analysis, yet are completely
missing from representative-agent models. This also explains why the existing literature based on
heterogeneous-agent models (e.g., Imrohoroglu, 1992) also obtains small welfare costs of in￿ ation:
To reduce computational costs this literature typically assumes that the probability of a binding
borrowing constraint is exogenously ￿xed rather than endogenously determined (e.g., by assuming
a binary distribution of idiosyncratic shocks). This makes the distribution of income not responsive
to environmental changes, dampening the welfare costs of in￿ ation.
My model is a generalization of the heterogeneous-agent CIA model of Lucas (1980) to a dynamic
stochastic general-equilibrium setting with capital accumulation. Since the Lucas model is not
analytically tractable, representative-agent versions of this model are routinely used in the literature
for business-cycle and policy analysis. However, I show that under quasi-linear preferences (or
indivisible labor) and a certain form of information/timing structure, the Lucas model becomes
analytically tractable and the distribution of real balances can be characterized by closed forms.
Consequently, both the short-run and long-run implications of monetary policies and aggregate
dynamics can be examined by standard solution methods available in the real-business-cycle (RBC)
literature, without the need to use complicated computational methods such as that of Krusell and
Smith (1998). Analytical tractability is a great virtue because it makes the model￿ s mechanisms
3transparent.4
The key factor in generating results that di⁄er from those of the literature is the sensitivity of the
distribution of income in response to environmental changes. As pointed out by Aiyagari (1994) and
Krusell and Smith (1998), under borrowing constraints, agents have strong incentives to self-insure
against idiosyncratic shocks through precautionary savings. Hence, in equilibrium the probability of
a binding borrowing constraint is very small or the fraction of the liquidity-constrained population
is very small. This implies that aggregate technology shocks have little impact on the distribution of
income because households are already nearly perfectly self-insured against such shocks. However,
the same precautionary-saving mechanism works against the individuals under in￿ ation or monetary
shocks, because self insurance implies that agents opt to hold too much cash in hand to avoid a
binding CIA constraint. Thus, they are heavily taxed by in￿ ation, leading to large welfare costs.
Also, the aggregate dynamics of the model react to monetary shocks signi￿cantly because transitory
monetary injections stimulate consumption for the liquidity-constrained individuals without much
impact on aggregate prices. Consequently, aggregate prices are "sticky" and money is expansionary
for aggregate output and employment. This is in sharp contrast to representative-agent CIA models
where monetary shocks are contractionary because prices move nearly one-for-one with the money
supply so that the in￿ ation tax e⁄ect dominates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and shows how to
obtain closed-form decision rules for money demand at the individual level. Section 3 characterizes
general equilibrium, and Section 4 presents the control model. The short- and long-run implications
of heterogeneity are studied in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of households indexed by i 2 [0;1]. As in Lucas (1980) and Krusell and
Smith (1998), each household is subject to an idiosyncratic preference shock to the marginal utility
of consumption, ￿(i), which has the distribution F(￿) ￿ Pr[￿(i) ￿ ￿] with support [￿l;￿h]. Leisure
enters the utility function linearly as in Wen (2009).5 A household chooses consumption c(i), labor
supply n(i), a non-monetary asset s(i) that pays the real rate of return r > 0, and nominal balance
m(i) to maximize lifetime utility,
4In a di⁄erent paper (Wen, 2009), I study welfare implications of ￿nancial intermediation and monetary policies
in a generalized Bewley (1980) model where money serves solely as a store of value and is not required as a medium
of exchange. The welfare costs of moderate in￿ ation in the two models are similar but those of hyperin￿ ation are
di⁄erent because of the CIA constraints. In Wen (2009), agents opt to not hold money as a store of value when the
in￿ ation rate is too high. In addition, the velocity of money is bounded by unit in this paper, whereas it is not the
case in Wen (2009). However, the solution techniques used in this paper are similar to that used in Wen (2009).
5The linearity assumption simpli￿es the model by making the distribution of wealth degenerate. However, the
distribution of money holdings is not degenerate. This setup also makes the results regarding the welfare costs of























where P denotes aggregate price, W the real wage, and ￿ a lump-sum per-capita nominal transfer.
Without loss of generality, assume a = 1 in the utility function.
To make the model analytically tractable, assume that cash accumulated in the current period,
mt(i), can be used immediately to facilitate consumption transactions, instead of waiting for one
period as in the standard CIA literature. This assumption is also more realistic because business-
cycle models are typically calibrated to quarterly or yearly frequencies; hence, requiring households
to hold cash for that long in order to purchase consumption goods is unrealistic. To capture the
liquidity role of money under this assumption, we also need to assume that the decisions for labor
supply and investment on interest-bearing assets (such as capital) must be made before observing
the idiosyncratic preference shock ￿(i) in each period. Thus, if there is an urge to consume in period
t, money stock is the only asset that can be adjusted to meet the liquidity demand. Borrowing of
liquidity (money) from other households is not allowed. These assumptions imply that households
may ￿nd it optimal not to spend all cash in hand in each period because carrying the excess money
balances to the next period may be bene￿cial when the current marginal utility of consumption
is low and future marginal utilities may be high.6 As in the standard literature, any aggregate
uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of each period and is orthogonal to idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Denoting f￿(i);￿(i)g as the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (1) and (2), respectively, the
￿rst-order conditions for fc(i);n(i);m(i);s(i)g are given, respectively, by













t￿t(i) = ￿Et(1 + rt+1)￿t+1(i); (6)
6See, e.g., Svensson (1985).
5where the expectation operator Ei denotes expectations conditional on the information set of time t
excluding ￿t(i). By the law of iterated expectations and the orthogonality assumption of aggregate












W is the marginal utility of consumption in terms of labor.
The decision rules at the individual￿ s level are characterized by a cuto⁄strategy, taking as given
the aggregate environment. Consider two possible cases:
Case A: ￿(i) ￿ ￿￿. In this case the urge to consume is low. Hence, it is optimal not to spend all
cash in hand but to carry the excess money as inventories. Thus, ct(i) ￿
mt(i)
Pt , ￿t(i) = 0, and the
shadow value of good ￿t(i) = ￿Et
Pt










x(i) ￿ (1 + r)st￿1(i) +
mt￿1(i) + ￿t
Pt
+ Wtnt(i) ￿ st(i) (9)


































which de￿nes the cuto⁄ ￿￿. Notice that the cuto⁄ is independent of i because the wealth x(i) is
determined before the realization of ￿t(i) and all households face the same distribution of idiosyn-
cratic shocks. This property simpli￿es the computation of the general equilibrium of the model
























Case B: ￿(i) > ￿￿. In this case the urge to consume is high. It is then optimal to spend all
cash in hand, so ￿t(i) > 0 and c(i) =
m(i)
Pt . By the resource constraint (1), we have ct(i) = 1
2x(i),








. Equations (3) and (5) then imply ￿(i) =
￿(i)
￿￿ ￿E P






























Notice that the shadow value ￿(i) is higher under case B than under case A.
The above analyses imply that the shadow price ￿(i) takes two possible functional forms; hence,
the expected shadow value of goods, Ei￿(i), and also the optimal cuto⁄ value ￿￿, are determined
























measures the (shadow) rate of return to liquidity or cash inventory. The left-hand side of equa-
tion (15) is the utility cost of holding one unit of real balances as inventory. The right-hand side
is the expected return to inventory, which takes two possible values: The ￿rst is simply the dis-
counted next-period utility cost of inventory (￿Et [Pt+1wt+1]
￿1) in the case of low liquidity demand
(￿ ￿ ￿￿), which has probability
R





￿1) in the case of high liquidity demand (￿ > ￿￿), which has probability
R
￿(i)>￿￿ dF(￿). The optimal cuto⁄ ￿￿ is chosen so that the marginal cost equals the expected mar-
ginal gains. Hence, the rate of return to inventory investment in money (liquidity) is determined by
R(￿￿). Notice that R(￿￿) > 1 as long as ￿￿ < ￿h. The fact that R > 1 implies that the option value
7of one dollar exceeds one because it provides liquidity in the event there is the urge to consume.
This inventory-theoretic formula of the rate of return to liquidity is similar to that derived by Wen
(2008, 2009).
The cuto⁄ strategy implies that the optimal level of wealth in period t is determined by a
"target" given by (12), which speci￿es that wealth (real money balances plus labor income net of
asset investment) is set to a target level depending on the cuto⁄ and the expected future utility.
This implies that labor supply will adjust so that the wealth level meets the target. Since all
individuals face the same distribution of idiosyncratic preference shocks, wealth distribution in this
model is degenerate. This greatly simpli￿es the computation of general equilibrium and makes
the model analytically tractable. However, heterogeneity still matters because the distribution of
money holdings is not degenerate.
















































(n(i)di; and X =
R
x(i)di and
integrating the household decision rules over i by the law of large numbers, the aggregate variables
are given by





































Notice D(￿￿) + H(￿￿) = 2￿￿ 1
￿ .
8The Quantity Theory. The aggregate relationship between consumption (21) and money
demand (22) implies the quantity equation,
PtCt = MtVt; (25)
















and is thus bounded above by unity and below away
from zero.7
Rule-of-Thumb Consumption Behavior. Notice that aggregate consumption follows the
linear rule
Ct = ~ ￿tXt; (27)
where ~ ￿ ￿
D(￿￿)
2￿￿(1=￿) 2 (0;1) is the marginal propensity to consume. However, here the marginal
propensity to consume is time varying and depends endogenously on aggregate economic conditions.
This type of consumption behavior is the consequence of the borrowing (CIA) constraint. When the
constraint is not binding, consumption essentially follows permanent income; and when it binds,
consumption is determined by the current real balances. Since the CIA constraint binds in only
some states of the world, the average consumption depends on current wealth-income with the
marginal propensity to consume being time-varying. The tendency for consumption smoothing is
captured by the fact that consumption is a function of wealth and the fact that
@~ ￿(￿￿)
@￿￿ < 0.8 For a
given increase in the real wage, consumption rises by D units but wealth (X) rises by ￿￿ > D units.
In addition, if the cuto⁄ ￿￿ also increases,9 D(￿￿) will rise by 1 ￿ F(￿￿) < 1 units while ￿￿ can
rise one for one. Hence, consumption rises proportionally less than wealth-income not only because
~ ￿ < 1 but also because ~ ￿ decreases. Similarly, the demand for real balances obeys the same linear
rule, Mt
Pt = ~ ￿tXt, where ~ ￿t ￿
H(￿￿)
2￿￿(1=￿) and the marginal propensity to hold money is also less than
one and countercyclical with respect to ￿￿. Demand on interest-bearing assets (St), on the other
hand, does not obey such simple rules.
Distributional E⁄ects. Notice that aggregate shocks will in general a⁄ect the distribution of
money holdings across households by a⁄ecting the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t. Equation (15) is the key to under-
standing such e⁄ects. For example, consider the situation without aggregate uncertainty. Equation
7Alternatively, we can also measure the velocity of money by aggregate income, PY = M ~ V , where ~ V ￿ V
Y
C is
the income-velocity of money.
8The proof is straightforward by using the de￿nition of D(￿
￿).
9As will be shown shortly, under a transitory monetary injection, ￿
￿ is procyclical.







Pt￿1 is the steady-state rate of in￿ ation.10 Hence, the distribution of money holdings
depend on in￿ ation. In particular, since @R
@￿￿ < 0, an increase in the rate of in￿ ation will decrease
the cuto⁄, hence shifting the distribution of money holdings towards one with more agents being
liquidity constrained. This suggests that with heterogeneous agents the welfare costs of in￿ ation
can be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those implied by representative-agent models because in￿ ation
a⁄ects the distribution of real balances.
With aggregate uncertainty, the strength of the distributional e⁄ects depends on the movements
of the real wage and prices. For example, the real wage behaves like consumption and is hence
smooth (because the movements in labor and output tend to cancel each other). In addition,
with money supply ￿xed, the aggregate price moves against consumption nearly one for one under
technology shocks, thus further dampening any movement in the real wage. Consequently, the
nominal wage and the cuto⁄ variable ￿￿ do not respond to technology shocks. This explains why
under technology shocks the model behaves similarly to a representative-agent model. This also
explains why Krusell and Smith (1998) ￿nd that consumption is proportional to wealth with the
marginal propensity to consume (~ ￿(￿￿)) remaining constant under aggregate technology shocks.
However, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ will respond to monetary shocks. This is the key for understanding why
money is not neutral in this model.
3 General Equilibrium
This heterogeneous-agent model outlined above can be easily embedded into a standard real business
cycle (RBC) framework with capital accumulation. For example, assume that capital is the only
non-monetary asset and is accumulated according to Kt+1￿(1 ￿ ￿)Kt = It, where I is gross aggre-
gate investment and ￿ rate of depreciation; the production technology is given by Yt = AtKt
￿N1￿￿
t ,
where A denotes total factor productivity (TFP). Under perfect competition, factor prices are de-
termined by marginal products, rt + ￿ = ￿ Yt
Kt and Wt = (1 ￿ ￿) Yt
Nt. Market clearing implies
St = Kt+1,
R
nt(i) = Nt, and Mt = Mt = Mt￿1+￿t, where Mt denotes aggregate money supply in
period t. Notice that equations (21), (22), and (20) with money market clearing (M = M￿1 + ￿)




Mt￿1 in the steady state, so the steady-state in￿ ation rate is the same
as the growth rate of money.
10imply the aggregate goods-market clearing condition,
Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = Yt: (29)
A general equilibrium is de￿ned as the sequence fCt;Yt;Nt;Kt+1;Mt;Pt;Wt;rt;￿￿
tg, such that
all households maximize utility subject to their resource and CIA constraints, ￿rms maximize
pro￿ts, all markets clear, the law of large numbers holds, and the set of standard transversality
conditions is satis￿ed. The equations needed to solve for the general equilibrium are (8), (15), (21),
(22), (29), the production function, ￿rms￿￿rst-order conditions with respect to fK;Ng, and the
law of motion for money, M = M￿1 + ￿. The aggregate model has a unique steady state. The
aggregate dynamics of the model can be solved by log-linearizing the aggregate model around the
steady state and then applying the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) to ￿nd the stationary
saddle path as in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
Monetary Policy. We consider two types (regimes) of monetary policies. For the short-run
dynamic analysis, money supply shocks are purely transitory without a⁄ecting the steady-state
stock of money,
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + M"t; (30)
Mt = M + ￿t; (31)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] and M is the steady-state money supply. This policy implies the percentage
deviation of money stock follows an AR(1) process, Mt￿M
M = ￿
Mt￿1￿M
M + "t. Under this policy
regime, the steady-state in￿ ation rate is zero, ￿ = 0.
For the long-run (steady-state) analysis, money supply has a permanent growth component
with,
￿t = (￿t ￿ 1)Mt￿1 (32)
log￿t = ￿log￿t￿1 + "t; "t ￿ iid(￿ ";￿2); (33)
where ￿t is the gross growth rate of money with mean ￿ ￿ and ￿ " = (1 ￿ ￿)log ￿ ￿ is the mean of the
innovation ".
4 The Control Model


























The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to fC;N;M;K0g are given, respectively, by
C￿￿
t = ￿t + ￿t (36)


















+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
: (39)
As argued by Cooley and Hansen (1989) and numerically illustrated by Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and
Lucas (1991), the CIA constraint (35) will almost always bind in all states, as long as the in￿ ation
rate is above the Friedman rule, ￿t =
Pt￿Pt￿1
Pt￿1 > ￿ ￿1. Hence, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989), we
assume the constraint holds with equality and the Lagrangian multiplier ￿t > 0 for all t.
5 Steady-State Comparison
To facilitate quantitative analysis, we assume the idiosyncratic shocks ￿(i) follow the Pareto distri-
bution, F(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿￿￿, with ￿ > 1 and the support ￿ 2 (1;1). Since the support is not bounded
above, monetary equilibrium with a strictly positive price level P > 0 does not exist under the
Friedman rule. Hence, our analysis in this part of the paper treats the Friedman rule as a limiting
case.11 We choose a log utility function (￿ = 1) and a su¢ ciently high degree of heterogeneity by
setting the shape parameter ￿ = 1:5.12 We set the time period to a quarter of a year, and the
discounting factor ￿ = 0:99.
11With the Pareto distribution, as 1 + ￿ approaches ￿, the demand for real balances approaches in￿nity. Since in
equilibrium money demand must equal money supply (which is ￿nite), this implies that the price level must approach
zero (or the value of money must approach in￿nity).
12The variance of the Pareto distribution is inversely related to ￿. The empirical literature based on distributions
of income and wealth typically ￿nds ￿ 2 (1:1;3:5) or centered around 1:5 ￿ 2:5 (see, e.g., Wol⁄, 1996; Fermi, 1998;
Levy and Levy, 2003; Clementi and Gallegati, 2005; and Nirei and Souma, 2007). The Gini index for money holdings
is about 0.8, indicating very high inequality (see Jellou, 2007). Hence, ￿ = 1:5 is within the empirical estimates.




constraint (34) implies C
Y = 1 ￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿(1￿￿). Equation (38) implies ￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) = (1 + ￿)￿; (36)






; (37) then implies
C =
1 + ￿







1￿￿ is the marginal product of labor, which is independent of in￿ ation.
Hence, consumption is decreasing in ￿. Under the Friedman rule, 1+￿ = ￿, we have the maximum














1￿￿(1￿￿), respectively. Since r+￿ = ￿ Y
K and W = (1￿￿)Y
N, the factor
prices are given by r = 1





1￿￿, respectively. These results are the
same as in the control model. Hence, heterogeneity does not alter the steady-state saving rate and
the real factor prices. However, the levels of income, consumption, employment, and capital stock
will be a⁄ected by heterogeneity. With the Pareto distribution, we have D(￿￿) = ￿
￿￿1 ￿ 1
￿￿1￿￿1￿￿
and R(￿￿) = 1 + 1
2
1
￿￿1￿￿￿￿, which implies (see equation 28) ￿￿ =
h
1+￿￿￿
￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
i￿ 1
￿. Hence, the


















which is decreasing in ￿. The maximum consumption is obtained under the Friedman rule, C￿ =
W ￿
￿￿1.
Interior solution requires ￿￿ > 1, which implies 1 + ￿ < 2￿￿1
2(￿￿1)￿. If a in￿ ation rate exceeds this
upper bound, all agents will have a binding CIA constraint in all states and the model degenerates
to the representative-agent control model. This implies that the two models are identical up to a
constant at two polar points: one under the Friedman rule and another at 1 + ￿max = 2￿￿1
2(￿￿1)￿.
These two points converge to one point as the variance of the distribution of ￿(i) decreases to zero.
In this case, the distribution of ￿(i) is degenerate (i.e., ￿ ! 1), and the two models become exactly
identical for all rates of in￿ ation.






which is the percentage reduction in consumption due to in￿ ation rising above the Friedman rule.
The welfare costs of in￿ ation and the velocity of money in the two di⁄erent models are graphed in
Figure 1, where dashed lines represent the control model.
Figure 1. Heterogeneous-Agent versus Representative-Agent Model.
Notice how heterogeneity alters the model￿ s implications for welfare costs. For example, at the
moderate in￿ ation rate of 1% a quarter (or 4% a year), the welfare cost is about 2% of consumption
in the control model; but it is about 20% in the heterogeneous-agent model. At ￿ = 2:5% a quarter
(or 10% a year), the welfare cost is 3:4% of consumption in the representative-agent model, but
23:6% in the heterogeneous-agent model. These are astonishingly large welfare loses, which are
comparable to the marginal income taxes in the U.S. With such a high welfare cost of moderate
in￿ ation, one starts to understand why so many times in human history violent revolutions were
14triggered by or associated with in￿ ation.13
Why does heterogeneity make such a large di⁄erence? One crucial reason is that, with idio-
syncratic shocks, the CIA constraint does not bind for many agents (or not very often for the same
agent) because of precautionary saving motives under idiosyncratic risk. This is very di⁄erent from
representative-agent models where the CIA constraint almost always binds under aggregate risks
(see the analysis of Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas, 1991). Figure 2 plots the probability of a
binding CIA constraint in the heterogeneous-agent model as a function of the in￿ ation rate. It
shows that the probability of running out of cash inventories is very low under moderate in￿ ation
(i.e., less than 10% of the time), suggesting that most agents opt to hold an excessive amount of
liquidity as a precautionary device for self insurance most of the time. This explains why in￿ ation
is so costly in the heterogeneous-agent model: (i) agents su⁄er disproportionately more from in￿ a-
tion tax when they hold more cash reserves as self-insurance; and (ii) as in￿ ation increases, more
agents will be liquidity constrained, further reducing aggregate consumption along the extensive
margin. These two mechanisms magnify the substitution e⁄ect between cash goods (consumption)
and credit goods (leisure), further reducing labor supply and output.
Figure 2. Probability of a Binding CIA Constraint.
The realism of the model can be tested by the U.S. "money demand" curve estimated by Lucas
(2000). Using long-term time series data for GDP, money stock (M1), and the nominal interest
rate, Lucas (2000) showed that the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP is downward sloping against the
13For empirical studies on the relationship between moderate in￿ ation and revolutions in recent world history, see
Cartwright, Delorme, and Wood (1985) and Looney (1985).
15nominal interest rate. Lucas interpreted this downward relationship as a "money demand" curve
and argued that it can be rationalized by the representative-agent Sidrauski (1967) model of money-
in-the-utility. Analogous to Lucas, the money demand curve implied by the heterogeneous-agent







where A is a scale parameter in￿ uenced by the de￿nition of money in the data and the cuto⁄ ￿￿ is
a function of the nominal interest rate implied by equation (28). Figure 3 shows a good ￿t of the
theoretical model to the U.S. data.14
Figure 3. Predicted Money Demand Curve and U.S. Data.
6 Impulse Responses
Following the standard RBC literature, we set the capital depreciation rate ￿ = 0:025 and capital￿ s
income share ￿ = 0:3. The impulse responses of the model to a 1% transitory increase in the money
14The circles in Figure 3 show plots of annual time series of a short-term nominal interest rate (the commercial
paper rate) against the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP for the United States for the period 1892￿ 1997. The data are
taken from the online Historical Statistics of the United States￿ Millennium Edition. The solid line with the cross (￿)
symbols is the model￿ s prediction calibrated at annual frequency with ￿ = 0:97; ￿ = 0:1;￿ = 0:3, and ￿ = 1:5. The
nominal interest rate in the model is de￿ned as
1+￿
￿ . The scale parameter is set to A = 0:08. Notice the predicted
money demand curve is close to that in Lagos and Wright (2005) and Wen (2009).
16stock under the ￿rst policy regime (30), Mt￿M
M = ￿
Mt￿1￿M
M +"t, where ￿ = 0:9, are shown in Figure
4 by the red symbols (circles), where the blue symbols (triangles) represent the control model.
Figure 4. Responses to Money Shock.
The ￿gure shows that under heterogeneity the economy responds to transitory monetary in-
jections very di⁄erently from its representative-agent counterpart. In particular, money is ex-
pansionary for aggregate output, consumption, and labor in the heterogeneous-agent model, but
contractionary in the control model.15 The price level appears very "sticky" and velocity is highly
countercyclical in the heterogeneous-agent model, whereas the price increases almost one-for-one
15Permanent increases in money, however, are no longer expansionary in the heterogeneous-agent model because
of anticipated in￿ ation.
17with money supply and velocity remains constant in the control model. The "sticky" price behavior
and countercyclical movements in velocity under transitory monetary shocks are consistent with the
data (see, e.g., Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond, 2008). The reason is as follows: Since only a small
fraction of the agents face a binding CIA constraint, a monetary injection stimulates consumption
signi￿cantly only for the liquidity-constrained agents; hence, aggregate price does not increase pro-
portionately with money. On the other hand, because a large fraction of the population are not
cash constrained, their individual monetary velocity decreases, reducing the aggregate velocity of
money.16
Figure 5. Responses to Technology Shock.
The situation changes dramatically under technology shocks. Figure 5 shows that the two mod-
els behave exactly the same under technology shocks. This is consistent with Krusell and Smith￿ s
(1998) ￿nding that heterogeneity does not matter: The aggregate dynamics of heterogeneous agents
behave just like those of a representative agent under technology shocks. Two crucial factors help
16Similar results are also obtained by Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008) in a Baumol-Tobin model and Wen
(2009) in a generalized Bewley (1980) model.
18explain this result. First, the representative-agent model and the heterogeneous-agent model have
the same aggregate saving rates in the steady state (i.e., the same capital-output ratio). In this
regard, heterogeneity does not matter. Second, technology shocks have no e⁄ect on the cuto⁄
value ￿￿
t; hence, they do not alter the income distribution of the population along the dynamic
path.17 Consequently, the aggregate dynamics are the same in the two models. However, monetary
shocks do a⁄ect the income distribution by impacting the cuto⁄ variable. A temporary increase in
money supply makes agents richer in cash balances and reduces the probability of a binding CIA
constraint, thereby raising the value of ￿￿
t.18
7 Conclusion
This paper provides an analytically tractable general-equilibrium model of heterogeneous money
demand with the cash-in-advance constraints. The model makes dramatically di⁄erent predictions
about monetary business cycles and the welfare costs of in￿ ation from the existing literature. Such
￿ndings are in contrast to those obtained by Krusell and Smith (1998), where they show that the
representative-agent assumption provides a very good approximation for aggregate behaviors of
heterogeneous agents. But my analysis shows that the results depend on the source of shocks and
whether it can signi￿cantly a⁄ect the distribution of income. In both the Krusell-Smith model
and my model, aggregate technology shocks do not change an individual￿ s probability of having a
binding borrowing constraint; hence, heterogeneity does not matter. However, monetary shocks in
my model can signi￿cantly alter an individual￿ s marginal propensity to save, thereby a⁄ecting the
business cycle dynamics and policy implications by shifting the distribution of real balances.
Being able to obtain closed-form solutions for the distribution of individuals￿money demand
functions is an additional contribution of this paper. The analytical intractability of the original
Lucas (1980) model has prevented its applicability in the literature and hence induced researchers
to use representative versions of that model for policy analysis. Consequently, the literature has
relied almost exclusively on the Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) framework to study the issue
of heterogeneous money demand and its policy implications.19 Hopefully, the model provided in
this paper may serve as an alternative to the Baumol-Tobin model for policy and business-cycle
analysis.
17The nominal wage remains constant under technology shocks in both models.
18In Krusell and Smith (1998), technology shocks do a⁄ect the income distribution (or the probability of a binding
borrowing constraint) because aggregate shocks are correlated with idiosyncratic shocks by assumption, but this
channel is not signi￿cant. In my model, the probability of a binding borrowing (CIA) constraint is signi￿cantly
a⁄ected by monetary shocks, albeit not by technology shocks; hence, money injection can have a signi￿cant aggregate
e⁄ect.
19For the monetary literature based on the Baumol-Tobin model, see Jovanovic (1982), Grossman and Weiss (1983),
Rotemberg (1984), Romer (1986), and Chatterjee and Corbae (1992). For the more recent literature, see Alvarez,
Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2008), Chiu (2007), and Khan and Thomas (2006), among
others.
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